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MARYLAND EXAMINES THE PROPOSED
UNIFORM PROPERTY ACT
By HERBERT MyImxBERG*
The Uniform Law of Property Act is the result of sev-
eral years of cooperative work by the American Law In-
stitute and the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. As
pointed out in the discussion at the Institute meeting be-
fore the Final Draft was adopted: "This is one of the
few pieces of work attempted by the Institute for the
purpose of putting legislation in force."' The specific pur-
poses of the Act are stated to be the assimilation "of in-
terests in real and personal property to each other, to sim-
plify their creation and transfer, and to protect the owners
of present and future interests. '2
The purpose of this articlela is to inquire to what extent
the several provisions of the proposed Act are at variance
with the existing law and public policy of the State of
Maryland, and, finally, whether it is desirable for us to
enact it in whole or in part. Generally, it may be stated
that from the standpoint of the Maryland law there are
few, if any, radical or far reaching innovations to be found
in the proposed Act. The first approach to this statute
is likely to be somewhat startling to those of us who have
* Of the Baltimore City Bar. LL.B., 1931, University of Baltimore School
of Law. Lecturer (Practice Court), University of Baltimore School of Law.115 American Law Institute Proceedings (1938) 184, statement of Mr.
George E. Beers of Connecticut.
2 See Introductory Note to official Final Draft.2
a This article was originally prepared by Mr. Myerberg at the request
of the Commission to Revise the Land and Inheritance Laws of Maryland,
and was referred to in the report of that Commission which was submitted
to the Maryland State Bar Association at its Annual Convention in June,
1939.-ED.
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been accustomed to finding our way through the tortuous
paths of this complex and difficult subject by climbing
over a myriad of words, forming interminable and almost
incomprehensible sentences. Disregarding as it does the
mysterious jargon of the common law, the Act is a model
of clarity in expression and simplicity of language.
It has been thought appropriate to discuss the Act sec-
tion by section, prefacing each division of the discussion
with a verbatim statement of the section involved. In ex-
planatory notes to several of the sections' as they appear
in the official draft of the Act, the Institute recommended
that each State insert certain provisions expressive of
local policy on the subjects therein treated. After modi-
fications pursuant to this direction were made, the Hon.
B. H. Hartogensis, Chairman of the Commission to Revise
the Land and Inheritance Laws of Maryland, caused the
Act as thus modified to be printed in the Daily Record on
February 10, 1939.4 In addition, three of the sections which
appeared in the original draft were eliminated by the In-
stitute at its meeting in May, 1938.5 Accordingly, the Act
as reproduced here is taken from the version which was
published in the Daily Record rather than from the of-
ficial draft. One or two sections which raise no problems
of interpretation or applicability in the light of the Mary-
land law have been omitted from the discussion. Where
such instances occur, the section will be reproduced for
convenience of reference in a footnote at the appropriate
place.
8 Sections 10, 19, 20.
'The only section of the Act as published in The Daily Record in which
there is a substantial departure from the original Final Draft is Section 19.
5 These are: Section 21, relating to "Security For The Protection Of A
Future Interest In A Movable"; Section 22, relating to "Single Action To
Recover For Damages To Property By A Person Having No Interest There-
in"; and Section 24, relating to "Waste-Change In The Land, Erection,
Alteration, Or Replacement Of Structure On The Land." See Proceedings,
op. cit. 8upra, n. 1, 182, 189, 192.
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SECTIONS 1 AND 36
Section 1. Definitions
As used in this Act and unless a different meaning
appears from the context, (a) the term "property"
means one or more interests either legal or equitable,
possessory or non-possessory, present or future, in
land, or in things other than land, including choses in
action, but excluding powers of appointment, powers
of sale and powers of revocation, except when specifi-
cally mentioned;
(b) the term "future interest" is applicable equally
to property interests in land and in things other than
land, and is limited to7 all varieties of remainders, re-
versions, executory interests, powers of termination
(otherwise known as rights of entry for condition
broken), and possibilities of reverter;
(c) the term "conveyance" means an act by which
it is intended to create one or more property interests,
irrespective of whether the act is intended to have
inter vivos or testamentary operation.
Section 3. Estate May Exist in Things
Other Than Land
Any possessory or future interest, power of appoint-
ment or of revocation, which can be created in this
State with regard to land, can also be created with
regard to anything other than land, including choses
in action.
The exclusion of various powers over property from the
definition of the term "property" in Section 1 (a) is in
6 That part of Section 1 which is not quoted in the text is as follows:
". (d) the term 'otherwise effective conveyance' means that the con-
veyance in question satisfies all the requirements of law other than the
particular matter dealt with in the Section of this Act In which the term is
used; (e) an intent is 'effectively manifested' when it is manifested by the
evidence of intent admissible according to the applicable rules of law with
respect to the admissibility of evidence."
Section 2, which is not discussed in the text, reads as follows: "The
provisions of this Act apply to corporations unless the context indicates a
more limited applicability." It is only necessary here to call attention to
Md. Code (1924) Art. 23, Sec. 9(6), which gives corporations full rights to
hold and dispose of realty and personalty. The proposed section, of course,
would be subject to the provisions in Md. Constitution, Declaration of
Rights, Art. 38, requiring legislative sanction for the acquisition of prop-
erty by a religious corporation.
The original draft reads "and includes" and would seem to be preferable
to "and is limited to".
1939]
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entire accord with the Maryland law, under which a power
has never been considered "an estate in land and does
not involve rights of property or ownership."'8
One of the main characteristics of these sections is their
assimilation of the law of real and personal property (so
far as the essentially different natures of immovable and
movable property will admit) relating to the creation, dur-
ation and time of enjoyment of estates or interests in prop-
erty. This does not embody a concept that is new or
strange in Maryland. Indeed, since 1916 we have been
familiar with the assimilation of the law of real and per-
sonal property with respect to characteristics other than
the duration and time of enjoyment of the estate created.
By Chapter 325, Section 1, of the Acts of 19169 the rules
governing the devolution of real and personal property
upon intestacy were assimilated so that the same persons
now take both species of property and in the same pro-
portions.'0 But it must be observed that the assimilation
of the law of real and personal property effected by these
sections is strictly limited to the rules governing the cre-
ation, duration and time of enjoyment of an interest or
estate. To determine whether any other specific legal con-
sequences have been assimilated, we must look to sources
other than these sections, as in the case of devolution upon
intestacy." This limitation necessarily arises from the es-
sential differences between land and chattels. Thus land
is readily identifiable, fixed, immovable, indestructible;
chattels may be lost, disguised, consumed or carried
away. 2  As pointed out by Professor Simes: 13
'Miller, Construction of Wills (1927) 706-707; Venable, Real Property
(1892) 163; Md. Mut. Benefit Society of Red Men v. Clendinen, Admr., 44
Md. 429, 433, 22 Am. Rep. 52, 55 (1475) ; Pope v. Safe Dep. & Tr. Co., 163
Md. 239, 161 A. 404 (1932); and see Smith, J., in Bauernschmidt v. Bauern-
schmidt, The Daily Record, May 16, 1939 (Ct. Ct. Balto. City, 1939).
'Codified as Md. Code (1924) Art. 46, Sec. 1.
10 Of course, common law dower in real property is still preserved, see
Md. Code (1924) Art. 45, Secs. 6, 7, 12.
1 The rule against perpetuities has been held applicable to limitations of
estates In either real or personal property. Safe Dep. & Tr. Co. v. Sheehan,
169 Md. 93, 179 A. 536 (1935).
121 Slmes, Future Interests (1936) Sec. 204.
Ibd Sec. 203.
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"... merely because a present or future interest in
personalty is like a life estate or remainder in land as
to duration of the privilege of enjoyment... may not
prove that the other legal consequences which attach
to life estates and remainders in land are present.' 14
Accordingly, the enactment of these sections will not af-
fect the necessity for complying with the Statute of Frauds
or other statutory provisions requiring a particular form
of writing and recording in order to create interests in land.
And it is apparent that these sections will do nothing to
change the law of this State by virtue of which title to the
real estate of a decedent passes directly to his heirs and
next of kin, while his chattels real and personal must first
pass through the Orphans' Court. Nor will these sections
solve the difficult and perplexing problem involved in pre-
serving the remainder interest in a chattel from destruc-
tion by the life tenant's sale of the article to a bona fide
purchaser, and the related problem of adjusting the re-
spective claims of the parties.15
Since the idea of a remainder interest in property has
its roots in the doctrine of seisin, the ancient common law
denied that there could be a future interest, to take effect
in expectancy, created in goods and chattels by a convey-
ance inter vivos, although the right to create such inter-
ests by will was recognized.'0 "But long before Sir Wil-
liam Blackstone wrote his Commentaries that distinction
was disregarded, and therefore, if a man, either by deed
or will, limited his books or furniture to A for life with
remainder over to B, this remainder was good, unless, in-
1" And see Ibid Sec. 215 where, dealing with legal characteristics and
consequences other than duration, Professor Simes says: "But, merely
because an interest in chattels is identical with a given interest in land as
to the duration of enjoyment, we should not conclude that other legal char-
acteristics are the same . . . Such matters as alienability and devolution
on intestacy are hereafter considered, as is also the important difference
with respect to the rights of the holder of the future interest to protection
from injury by the holder of the present interest or by strangers. . . . the
whole doctrine of the duty of the life tenant to give security for the pro-
tection of the remainderman of a chattel has been evolved because of the
intrinsic character of chattels, and so is inapplicable to future Interests in
land."
Ibid Sec. 217 et 8eq.
16 Culbreth v. Smith, 69 Md. 450, 16 A. 112 (1888) ; Miller, op cit. supra
n. 8, Sec. 214.
1939]
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deed, the property was such that its use was its consump-
tion."' 7  And in Maryland from the earliest times future
estates in money and other personal property have been
recognized, whether limited by way of a condition prece-
dent, 8 executory devise or remainder. 9 With respect to
the creation of possessory interests in personalty, analogous
to those recognized in realty there is no difficulty. These
have been frequently sustained, as in the cases of Devec-
mon v. Shaw,20 and Bradfor v. McKenzie,2' which hold that
absolute interests may be created in personalty, defeasible
upon the happening of specified contingencies, analogous
to a determinable fee.22
It is apparent, therefore, that the proposed Sections 1
and 3 are hardly more than declaratory of the existing
Maryland law. There is, however, one important question
raised by Section 3 when considered in the light of the
Maryland rule which prohibits the creation of a remainder
interest in a chattel which is consumed by its use. In ac-
17 Culbreth v. Smith, 69 Md. 450, 457, 16 A. 112, 115 (1888).
"Hanson v. Brawner, 2 Md. 90 (1852) involving a bequest to Mary
.... should she attain the age of 18 years, etc."; Gunther and Can-
field v. The State, use of Bouldin, 31 Md. 21 (1869), involving a legacy of
$2,000 to an adopted son of the testator "should he attain the age of 21
years"; Webb v. Webb, 92 Md. 101, 48 A. 95, 84 Am. St. Rep. 499 (1900),
involving a legacy of $1,000 "to each of my grandsons .. .who may live
to reach the age of 21 years".
1" Boyd v. Boyd, 6 G. & J. 25 (1833), vested remainder in money; Evans,
et al. v. Igelhart, et al., 6 G. & J. 171 (1834), vested remainder in chattels;
Clagett v. Worthington, 3 Gill 83, 93 (1845), contingent remainder over as
to both personalty and realty; Miller v. Williamson, 5 Md. 219 (1853),
vested remainder in a mortgage debt; Drovers' & Mech. Bank v. Hughes,
83 Md. 355, 34 A. 1012 (1896), Involving both vested and contingent re-
mainders in shares of stock; State, use of Taylor, et al., v. Brown, et al.,
64 Md. 97, 1 A. 410 (1885) ; and State, use of Dittman, v. Robinson, 57 Md.
486 (1882), both involving remainders in a sum of money; Brady v. Brady,
et al., 78 Md. 461, 28 A. 515 (1894), remainder in stocks, securities and
money; Mills v. Bailey, 88 Md. 320, 41 A. 780 (1898), remainder in per-
sonalty after a life estate with power of disposition; Armiger v. Reitz, 91
Md. 334, 46 A. 990 (1900), remainder in bonds. See also the following
cases, where remainder interests in personalty were recognized without
discussion: Sharp v. State, 135 Md. 551, 109 A. 454 (1920) ; Carey v. Dykes,
138 Md. 142, 144, 113 A. 626, 627 (1921) ; Cowman v. Classen, 156 Md. 428,
437-8, 144 A. 367, 371-2 (1929) ; Melville v. Page, 165 Md. 597, 170 A. 175
(1933).20 70 Md. 219, 225, i A. 645 (1889).
21131 Md. 330, 101 A. 774 (1917).
"And see Kuykendall v. Devecmon, 78 Md. 537, 28 A. 412 (1894) ; and
Gough v. Manning, 26 Md. 347 (1867) where it was held that a devise to
a widow, on condition that she does not marry, is valid as to both real
and personal property, if there is a limitation over.
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cordance with Section 3 "any future interest... which can
be created in this State with regard to land, can also be
created with regard to anything other than land," and it
might be argued with some plausibility that the language
is broad enough to include even articles which are con-
sumed by their use. Such a construction would hardly be
consistent with the long established policy in this State
which gives the life tenant an absolute estate in consum-
ables, where the gift failed to show an intent not to give
the life tenant specific use of the chattel.
The leading case of Evans v. Iglehart" established the
following principles concerning future interests in chat-
tels:
1. A life estate in a chattel may be granted to one per-
son with remainder over to another.
2. A power of appointment may be given to a life ten-
ant of a chattel.
3. A life tenant is entitled to the specific use of the
chattel unless the conveyor expresses a contrary intent.
4. Where the article of personalty is of such a nature
that its use is its consumption and it is specifically given
for life, with remainder over, the life tenant takes the ab-
solute property in the article; and the limitation over is
in effect rejected.
5. But if the gift "consists of money or property, whose
use is the conversion into money, and which it could not
for that reason be intended should be specifically enjoyed
nor consumed in the use, but be by the executor converted
into money for the benefit of the estate, as for example a
quantity of merchandise, a crop of tobacco or the like; an
investment thereof must be made by the executor."
These principles have been frequently restated and
applied by the Maryland decisions. 24  In Seabrook v.
236 G. and J. 171 (Md. 1834).
21 Wooten v. Burch, 2 Md. Ch. 190 (1851); State v. Robinson, 57 Md.
486 (1881); Culbreth v. Smith, 69 Md. 450, 16 A. 112, 1 L. R. A. 538,
(1888) ; Siechrist v. Bose, 87 Md. 284, 39 A. 745 (1898) ; Seabrook v.
Grimes, 107 Md. 410, 68 A. 883, 126 Am. St. Rep. 400, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.)
483 (1908); Smith v. Michael, 113 Md. 10, 77 A. 282 (1910); Foley v.
Syer, 121 Md. 79, 87 A. 1111 (1913).
See also Md. Code (1924) Art. 93, Sec. 10, which requires executors
(charged with retaining the whole or a part of the personal estate, in
1939]
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Grimes,25 where the rule as to consumables was applied to a
newspaper business and plant, the Court referred to the doc-
trine as an "inflexible rule of law." In view of this strong
indication of policy on the subject, it may not be wise
to leave the question open to construction under the pro-
posed Section 3, however remote the possibility of an inter-
pretation at variance with the present rule in Maryland.
Some consideration, therefore, should be given to an
amendment expressly excluding consumables from the
operation of Section 3.28
cases where "money or some other thing is directed to be paid at a dis-
tant period, or upon a contingency") to apply to the Orphans' Court or
a Court of Equity for instructions as to investment. This statute was
construed in Smith v. Michael, supra, where it was said: "It may apply
to a legacy for life with remainder over at the death of the life tenant,
and whether it does apply in such cases generally depends upon whether
by the terms of the will, or of necessity (in order to carry out the inten-
tion of the testator as shown by the will) the personal estate or the part
thereof so bequeathed must remain in the hands of the executor .... If
it is to so remain, then the section does apply, but if it Is simply to be in-
vested and then distributed to the tenant for life to be held under
the terms of the will, then ordinarily it does not apply." The Court fur-
ther said that independently of Md. Code (1924) Art. 93, Sec. 10, it was
the duty of the executor under Evans v. Iglehart, 6 G. & J. 171 (Md.
1834), to invest when the property bequeathed for life was money or
other thing whose use is conversion into money. And in this connection,
see also Siechrist v. Bose, supra, where in holding that the executor was
required to invest although Md. Code (1924) Art. 93, Sec. 10 did not apply,
the Court said that after investment the securities should be turned over
to the life tenant, and "If her treatment of it was such as to jeopardize
its safety, a Court of Equity on proper application has full power to re-
quire such security to be given as might be needed".
For other cases dealing with circumstances under which the Court will
require the life tenant to furnish security, see the cases cited supra in
this note, and also Boyd v. Boyd, 6 G. and J. 25 (Md. 1833) ; and Miller
v. Williamson, 5 Md. 219 (1853). Section 21 of the Final Draft of the
Act as originally proposed dealt with "Security for the protection of a
future interest in a movable" and gave the Court discretion in all cases
whether or not to require security. In discussing the section at the
meeting of the American Law Institute, some of the members felt that
it was not advisable to leave the matter to the discretion of the Court
in all cases since, under what was stated to be the existing law, it was
mandatory to grant security when the future interest was one that was
certain to take effect. Upon a division, the entire section was deleted by a
vote of 44 to 35. 15 American Law Institute Proceedings (1938) 179-182.
1 Supra n. 24.
26 Perhaps the following addition at the end of the section would suf-
fice: "but excluding future interests in consumables which are given spe-
cifically to the first taker".
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SECTION 4
Interest Conveyed
An otherwise effective conveyance of property
transfers the entire interest which the conveyor has
and has the power to convey unless an intent to trans-
fer a less interest is effectively manifested. No words
of inheritance or other special words are necessary
to transfer a fee simple.
This has long been the Maryland law by virtue of Sec-
tions 11 and 12 of Article 21 (as to deeds) and Section 336
of Article 93 (as to wills) of the Maryland Code of 1924.
Relying upon these provisions, the Court of Appeals has
held that where a contrary intention is not clearly shown,
both deeds and assignments, as well as wills, though with-
out words of limitation or perpetuity, are presumed to
carry such estate as the grantor, or testator has the power
to convey, assign, or dispose of by will, and not an estate
limited to the life of the grantee or legatee, or an estate
or interest less than that over which such party has the
power of disposition.2 7
SEcMoN 5
Interest Created by the Exercise of a Power of
Appointment, Power of Sale, or Power
of Revocation
An otherwise effective exercise of a power of ap-
pointment, a power of sale, or a power of revocation,
whether inter vivos or by a testamentary disposition,
transfers or revokes the entire interest which the
holder thereof has the power to transfer or to revoke
unless an intent to transfer or to revoke a less interest
is effectively manifested.
There can be little doubt that this section is but declara-
tory of the existing law. Formerly, there was some ques-
tion under the common law whether a donee of a power
" Case v. Marshall, 159 Md. 588, 594, 152 A. 261, 263 (1930). See also,
Evans v. Brady, 79 Md. 142, 28 A. 1061 (1894); Johns Hopkins Univ. v.
Garrett, 128 Md. 343, 97 A. 640 (1916) ; Miller, op. cit. supra n. 8, Sec. 100.
1939]
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might appoint a less estate than that which he had been
given power to appoint." But the law soon became set-
tled that the donee may create a less estate provided the
exercise of the power contained a clear expression of in-
tent to do so. 29 It would seem to follow as a natural con-
sequence that unless such an intent were expressed, the
entire interest passed. In Reeside v. Annex Bldg. Associa-
tion,8 a life tenant with power to sell or mortgage in fee
simple, in executing a mortgage upon the property with-
out words of limitation in the granting clause, was held to
have conveyed a fee simple estate. Although this case is
not directly in point, as the decision turned largely on the
question of whether the power had been exercised at all,
it is enough to demonstrate that the rule prescribed by the
proposed section is consistent with the Maryland statutes
and decisions and in furtherance of our legislative policy
to give the fullest possible effect to instruments purport-
ing to transfer or create interests in property.
SECTIONS 7 AND 831
Section 7. Conveyance of Future Interests
The conveyance of an existing future interest,
whether legal or equitable, is not ineffective on the
sole ground that the interest so conveyed is future or
contingent.
Section 8. Subjection of Future Interests to
Claims of Creditors
The subjection to the claims of creditors of a fu-
ture interest, whether legal or equitable, is not pre-
vented or avoided on the sole ground that such inter-
est is future or contingent.
28 2 Sugden, Powers (1837) Secs. 39-40.
29 Ibid.
80 165 Md. 200, 210, 167 A. 72, 76 (1933).
81 Section 6 provides: "Interest Reserved. An otherwise effective reser-
vation of property by the conveyor reserves the interest the conveyor had
prior to the conveyance unless an intent to reserve a different interest is
effectively manifested".
In an informal letter to the author, Mr. Charles McHenry Howard
stated that it was his off-hand impression that-"Section 6 seems to be
intended to cover the case of a reservation of part of the property con-
veyed, or an interest in it, to the conveyor. For instance, if A by deed
[VOL. IV
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The transferability of contingent remainders and other
future interests has always been a troublesome problem.
2
There is much labor and little profit in tracing back to its
feudal foundations the common law rule which denied
alienability to all contingent future interests. In Mary-
land we have become accustomed to a departure from this
strict rule, which may be expressed by the following form-
ula: If the person to take is certain, but merely the event,
on the happening of which the estate vests, is uncertain,
then although the remainder is contingent, it is assign-
able and subject to the claims of creditors; but if, on the
other hand, the person to take is uncertain, then the re-
mainder is not assignable or subject to the claims of credi-
tors.88 Thus an estate to A with remainder to his children,
but, if he dies without leaving children, then to B, gives
convey Blackacre to B, his heirs and assigns, reserving to A, the grantor,
a small piece at one corner; then the object of the section would be to
show that it would not be necessary that the reservation should run to
A, his heirs and assigns; so that a reservation without such words of per-
petuity would still reserve a fee simple estate in the specified part, un-
less a different intent were expressed."
In a communication to the author, Professor Reno of the University of
Maryland stated: "In my opinion Sec. 6 is contra to the Maryland cases.
In Herbert v. Pue, 72 Md. 307, 20 A. 182 (1890), our Court of Appeals rec-
ognized the difference between an exception and a reservation, by pointing
out that an exception operates to retain in the conveyor an existing cor-
poreal estate while a reservation operates to create in the conveyor a new
incorporeal interest. Applying this distinction the Court in Ross v. McGee,
98 Md. 389, 56 A. 1118 (1904), held that the creation of an easement in
the conveyor was a reservation, and that words of inheritance were neces-
sary in order to make it last longer than the life of the conveyor, Md.
Code (1924) Sec. 11, Art. 21 not applying to reservations of incorporeal
interests.
"Mr. Howard's example illustrates the operation of an exception of a
corporeal estate, in which words of inheritance were never required at
common law. 1 Restatement, Property (1936) Sec. 27 (j). In my opinion
the use of the term 'reservation of property' would include not only an
exception of a corporeal estate but also a reservation of an incorporeal in-
terest, and therefore this section is contra to Ross v. McGee, 98 Md. 389,
56 A. 1118 (1904)."
But it would seem that this departure from the existing Maryland law
is desirable and in conformity with the policy of this State to give the
fullest possible effect to an instrument purporting to create an interest
in property without the necessity for using technical words.
82 See, for a comprehensive treatment of the subject, Reno, Alienability
and Transmissibility of Future Interests in Maryland (1938) 2 Md. L.
Rev. 89.
I8 Demill v. Reid, 71 Md. 175, 17 A. 1014 (1889) ; In re Banks' Will, 87
Md. 425, 40 A. 268 (1898) ; Fisher v. Wagner, 109 Md. 243, 71 A. 999, 21
L. R. A. (N. S.) 121 (1909); Schapiro v. Howard, 113 Md. 360, 78 A. 58,
140 Am. St. Rep. 914 (1910); Jenkins v. Bonsal, 116 Md. 629, 82 A. 229
(1911); Reilly v. Mackenzie, 151 Md. 216, 134 A. 502, 48 A. L. R. 778
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B a contingent remainder of the first type which is freely
transferable.34 In such case, the gift is to a specified and
ascertained person and only the event upon which he is
to take (A's death without leaving children) is contin-
gent. The same is true of a gift to A for life with re-
mainder after A's death to B and C provided they be then
living;35 subject to the qualification, however, that such a
remainder would not be devisable, as survival until the
time of vesting in possession is an express condition of the
gift.36 On the other hand, a gift to A for life with remain-
der to his children then living is not transferable as the
persons to take are uncertain and not ascertainable until
the death of the life tenant.87 "In such a case it would seem
that the existence of remaindermen cannot be disassociated
from their capacity to take, and that, as such capacity can-
not exist before their ascertainment by the death of the
first taker, they cannot be regarded as in esse before that
event, so far as the alienability or transmissability of any
interest or title under the limitation is concerned." '
The formula above stated must be regarded as quali-
fied, however, by the well established rule in Maryland
that a conveyance of an interest contingent as to the per-
(1926) ; Suskin & Berry v. Rumley, 37 Fed. (2d) 304 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930);
and In re Twaddel, 110 Fed. 145 (D. Del. 1901).
A remainder certain as to the person but contingent only as to event, is
frequently designated as a "vested interest in a contingent remainder"
(Reilly v. Mackenzie, supra; Suskin and Berry v. Rumley, supra). Mr.
Reno points out, however that, "this is an ambiguous use of the term
,vested', and should be more correctly described as a 'transferable inter-
est' in a contingent remainder or executory interest." See Reno, supra
n. 32, 89, 92, n. 13.
8, Fisher v. Wagner, supra n. 33; Jenkins v. Bonsal, supra n. 33.
15 Analogous to the gift in Reilly v. Mackenzie, supra n. 33, where, in a
preceding paragraph of the will the testator referred specifically and by
name to his eight children and later, in providing for disposition of the
corpus upon the death of the life tenant, gave one-eighth "to each of my
said children, should they be then living". This is the same as if the
testator had re-enumerated his children, so that the gift was to them as
individuals rather than as a class. See text, post.
3' Fisher v. Wagner, supra n. 33.
' Schapiro v. Howard, supra n. 33; Suskin and Berry v. Rumley, supra
n. 33.
" In re Twaddel, supra n. 33. See also Miller, op. cit. supra n. 8, Sec.
233: ". . . such a naked possibility is neither an estate, property right or
claim. ... Such a possibility is an abstraction too remote for any form
of conveyance to reach, and is therefore neither devisable, descendible,
alienable by voluntary conveyance, nor subject to execution, nor does it
pass to a trustee in insolvency".
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son to take or even a mere expectancy will be enforced in
equity after the estate has vested, provided it is supported
by a valuable consideration. Nor does the formula pur-
port to cover such contingent future interests as possibili-
ties of reverter or rights of entry. As to these it may be
observed that although the taker is ascertained, assign-
ment inter vivos may not be permitted. The law in Mary-
land on this subject is not settled. As Mr. Reno points
out: 
40
"The question of alienability inter vivos of possi-
bilities of reverter has never been definitely passed
on in Maryland. In Kelso v. Stigar (75 Md. 376) the
Court strongly intimated that a mere possibility of re-
verter was not an alienable interest and therefore not
an asset of an insolvent debtor.... There is no Mary-
land decision positively denying the alienability of a
right of entry, although Gwynn v. Jones, (2 G. and J.
173) contains a strong intimation that at common law
a right of entry is unassignable even after breach. So
strong has been the opposition to permitting rights of
entry to be assignable, that several courts have re-
fused to grant specific performance in equity as a
means of accomplishing an indirect assignment."
It is submitted, however, that in Maryland a court of equity
would recognize and enforce the rights of a bona fide pur-
chaser for value of such an interest if there were no inter-
vening paramount equities.4'
With respect to the right to make a testamentary dis-
position of contingent future interests, "our Maryland stat-
ute (Code, Art. 93, Sec. 328) is very explicit in providing
that 'all lands, tenements and hereditaments which might
pass by deed . . .and all rights of entry for a condition
broken, and all rights and possibilities of reverter shall be
subject to be disposed of, transferred and passed by his
" Schapiro v. Howard, supra n. 33; Keys v. Keys, 148 Md. 397, 129 A.
504 (1925); Miller v. Hirschman, 170 Md. 145, 183 A. 259 (1936): Reilly
v. Mackenzie, supra n. 33, also mentions this doctrine.
Reno, supra n. 32, 96 also refers to the warranty deed as an effective
device for alienating executory interests contingent upon ascertainment
of the taker.
,
0 Reno, supra n. 32, 98-99.
"See cases supra n. 39, especially Keys v. Keys, where a conveyance of
a mere expectancy was enforced.
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or her last will or codicil.' In Fisher v. Wagner, the Mary-
land Court held that under this statute all reversions,
vested and contingent remainders, executory interests, and
possibilities of an estate are devisable, if survival until
the time of vesting in possession is not an implied or ex-
press condition."42
It has been urged by Mr. Reno in the article referred
to43 that the case of Reilly v. Mackenzie4 has destroyed
the distinction announced in In re Banks' Will45 and ex-
pressed in the formula above stated, between remainders
contingent only as to event and those which are contin-
gent as to the person to take. A re-examination of the facts
in Reilly v. Mackenzie will show that in spite of certain'
misleading language in the opinion (which may be char-
acterized as argumentative dicta) the decision is not a de-
parture from the settled rule in this State which prohibits
the alienation of remainders limited to unascertained per-
sons. In this case, Clause C of the will required a division
of a certain portion of the income of the estate into eight
parts with a direction that during the lifetime of the tes-
tator's wife, one part or one-eighth should be distributed
to each of the testator's eight children, whose names were
specifically set out with "one eighth" after the name of
each child. Clause D provided that upon the death of the
testator's wife, the entire corpus was to be divided into
eight parts and one of said parts should be paid over "to
each of my said children should they be then living," with
a further provision for descendants of deceased children.
Charles M. Rahe, Jr., one of the children named in the
will, went into bankruptcy, and his trustee petitioned the
equity court to award him the bankrupt's remainder in-
terest. This was resisted on the ground that the provi-
sion "should they be then living" rendered the remainders
12 Reno, supra n. 32, 107. And see Miller, op. Cit. 8upra n. 8, Sec. 210.
See Hasley et al. v. Convention of the Prot. Epis. Church, et al., 75 Md.
275, 23 A. 78 (1892) where it was held that an expectancy under a will
is a mere naked possibility and cannot be devised.
"
8 Reno, supra n. 32, 93-96.
"1151 Md. 216, 134 A. 502, 48 A. L. R. 778 (1926).
4587 Md. 425, 40 A. 268 (1898).
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uncertain as to person and, therefore, not transferable;
but, in holding that the interest of Charles M. Rahe, Jr.
passed to his trustee in bankruptcy, the Court said:46
"In the present case the contingency related to the
event, that is, the survival of the bankrupt and not to
who would take if the event should happen. It was
not such an interest as could be devised. But it was
a possibility coupled with an interest, nevertheless, and
as such was assignable under the rule laid down in
Moore v. Lyon (25 Wend. 119) and quoted with ap-
proval in Putnam v. Story (132 Mass. 205) and Lee
v. Waltjen (141 Md. 450)." (Italics supplied.)-
Commenting on this ruling, Mr. Reno says:
"But this case holds that survival of a prospective
taker to the time for ascertainment is an event and
his interest is therefore alienable. Thus if the case
of Reilly v. Mackenzie is followed, then the entire com-
mon law rule of inalienability of contingent remain-
ders and executory interests is abolished in Maryland.
All contingent remainders and executory interests are
alienable by a prospective taker, and if there is no
prospective taker in esse the problem of alienability
cannot arise.
"Under no reasonable interpretation can Reilly v.
Mackenzie be reconciled with the earlier case of In re
Banks' Will. Our only conclusion must be . . .that
under Maryland law contingent remainders and ex-
ecutory interests are alienable whether the contin-
gency arises because of a condition precedent or be-
cause the taker is unascertained."
It must be conceded that the reliance of the Court upon
the Massachusetts cases, cited above, as well as upon a dic-
tum employed in In re Banks' Will in distinguishing these
same cases, lends considerable support to Mr. Reno's con-
clusion. As pointed out by Mr. Tiffany, the Massachusetts
cases regard a remainder in favor of uncertain persons
46 151 Md. 216, 225, 134 A. 502, 506, 48 A. L. R. 778, 784 (1926).
" Reno, supra n. 32, 94-95.
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as alienable by the person who would take if the remain-
der were immediately to vest.4  To appreciate the sig-
nificance of the Court's reference to In re Banks' Will,41
it is necessary to understand the facts of that case. There
was a devise by Daniel Banks in trust for Anna Godwin
for life with remainder to her issue living at her death
(which is a typical case of an inalienable remainder be-
cause uncertain as to the person to take) 0 with a further
provision that in case any of her children should die be-
fore attaining the age of twenty-one years and without is-
sue, the share devised to them respectively should devolve
upon such persons as by the then existing laws of Mary-
land would take the same as heirs at law of the testator.
W. Frank Godwin, one of Anna's children, died in 1896,
after the death of his mother, before reaching twenty-one
and without issue. Andrew Banks, a son of the testator,
and therefore one of the heirs at law of the testator, had
in 1889 applied for the benefit of the insolvent laws, and
his trustee claimed that the debtor had such an interest
in the executory devise of that part of the testator's es-
tate which devolved upon those who were his heirs at the
time of the death of W. Frank Godwin, as would pass to
the trustee. It is apparent that the only question before
the Court was whether Andrew Banks, the heir at law,
had an alienable interest in the executory devise. The
Court held that Banks' interest was not alienable. In the
course of distinguishing the Massachusetts cases to which
reference has already been made, the Court said that they
were only "authority for holding that if W. Frank God-
win, (Anna's issue) had become insolvent.., that his in-
terest would have passed to his assignee, subject to be di-
vested by his death before his mother."51  The Court did
not say that such would have been the ruling if the ques-
tion had been presented; as indeed it could not have been,
,8 1 Tiffany, Real Property (2d Ed. 1920) 525. More v. Lyon, 25 Wend.
119 (N. Y. 1840) ; Putnam v. Story, 132 Mass. 205 (1882); Clarke v. Fay,
205 Mass. 228, 91 N. E. 328 (1910).
'9 Supra n. 45.
90 See aupra n. 37.
187 Md. 425, 443, 40 A. 268, 274 (1898).
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since the first limitation, as already pointed out, was like-
wise contingent as to the person to take. Nevertheless,
the Court of Appeals in Reilly v. Mackenzie relied on this
dictum as indicating "what would have become of W.
Frank Godwin's contingent remainder, if he had become
insolvent, '' 52 as though the Banks case had held that an
interest uncertain as to the person to take might be as-
signed, which (as we have seen) was the very converse
of what was decided in that case.
Disregarding the complicated mechanics of the writ-
ten opinion, we find in the particular facts of Reilly v.
Mackenzie the basis for reconciling it with the long estab-
lished rule in this State. Mr. Reno regards the limitation
as if it were merely to A for life with remainder to "my
children then living". If this were all that could be found
in the will, no one would even make a pretense at distin-
guishing Reilly v. Mackenzie from In re Banks' Will or
Schapiro v. Howard." When the entire will in the Reilly
case is examined, we find that the limitation was not in
the usual form of a remainder to a class. In Clause C,
where certain immediate provision was made for them,
the testator's eight children were specifically named. In
the next succeeding clause (Clause D) the limitation in
remainder was created by directing the corpus to "be di-
vided into eight equal parts, and one of said parts shall
be paid over by said trustee to each of my said eight chil-
dren should they then be living." Not only do the words
"said eight children" refer back to the persons specifically
designated in Clause C, but the further requirement that
the corpus be divided into eight equal parts and distributed
in one-eighth shares shows that the testator's gift was to
definitely ascertained and designated persons.
This view is further strengthened by the additional pro-
vision in Clause D, whereby the testator singled out one
of his children by name (John Gerhart Rahe) and stipu-
lated that as to him the trust should continue until he
2 151 Md. 216, 222, 134 A. 502, 504, 48 A. L. R. 778, 782 (1926).
53 113 Md. 360, 78 A. 58, 140 Am. St. Rep. 914 (1910).
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reached forty years, with a spendthrift provision.54 If the
testator had intended a gift to an unascertained class, it
is not likely that so personal a condition, made necessary
by the individual character of the designated child, would
have been inserted. Accordingly, the remainder interest
in the Reilly case was the same as if it had been limited
to A for life with remainder to B, should he be then liv-
ing. There was no remainder to a class of unascertained
persons, but a vested or transferable interest in a contin-
gent remainder, liable to be divested as to any one of
the named children should such child not be living upon
the death of the wife. This conclusion finds support in
Fisher v. Wagner, where, in discussing the authorities, the
Court said:55
"It further clearly recognized the distinction be-
tween a case where an individual is named, or defi-
nitely described as the party to take, and one where
there is a limitation to a class."
Of course, since survival until the time of vesting in pos-
session is an express condition of the gift, the interest is
not devisable and Reilly v. Mackenzie so held.56  But it is
clear that survivorship in this case was an event and not
merely the occasion for determining the identity of the
remaindermen, who had been specifically enumerated, and
the Court was correct in holding that the interest was as-
signable because: 57
" The entire clause reads as follows: "D. Upon the death of my wife,
Mary E. Rahe, I direct that the whole corpus of my estate including the
dwelling and furniture devised to my wife for life, shall be divided into
eight equal parts, and one of said parts shall be paid over by said trustee
to each of my said eight children should they be then living except as to
the share of my said son, John Gerhardt Rabe, which shall be held by
the said trustee and invested and reinvested, and the net income only
paid to my said son, in quarterly installments, until he shall reach the
age of forty years, when the trust as to his share shall cease, and his
portion of the corpus shall be paid over to him absolutely. But my said
son, shall have no power to anticipate said income, nor to assign it, and
his receipt only shall be sufficient acquitance to said trustee." 151 Md.,
216, 218, 219, 134 A. 502, 503 (1926).
"109 Md. 243, 253, 71 A. 999, 1002 (1908).
"See also Reno, 8upra n. 32, 108-112, where this subject is discussed in
connection with the problem of when survival of the remainderman is an
implied condition precedent.
" 151 Md. 216, 225, 134 A. 502, 506, 48 A. L. R. 778, 784 (1926).
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"In the present case the contingency related to the
event, that is, the survival of the bankrupt and not
to who would take if the event should happen."
In the case of Suskin and Berry v. Rumley, 8 the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, interpret-
ing the decision in Reilly v. Mackenzie as consistent with
In re Banks' Will, held that a remainder contingent as to
the person to take was not an asset in the hands of a trus-
tee in bankruptcy. The limitation in that case was "to
my sister, Mary C. Taylor, during her life, and upon her
death.., to the then living issue or descendants of my said
sister." Unlike Reilly v. Mackenzie, there was no spe-
cific enumeration or designation of the remaindermen so
that they were unascertainable until the death of the life
tenant, and survival of a prospective taker was properly
held not to be an event,59 but rather the occasion for ascer-
taining the identity of the remainderman.
Without regard to whether Mr. Reno's interpretation
of Reilly v. Mackenzie or the one suggested here is the
correct one, the difference of opinion on this subject dem-
onstrates the wisdom of setting it at rest by the enactment
of the proposed Section 7, which would make all contin-
gent remainders and executory interests alienable whether
the contingency arises because of uncertainty as to the
event or the person to take, thus abolishing the distinc-
tion announced in In re Banks' Will, and clearing up the
doubt as to the transferability of rights of entry and pos-
sibilities of reverter.60 There is certainly nothing in the
8 37 Fed. (2d) 304 (C. C. A. 4th 1930). Followed in In re Martin, 47
Fed. (2d) 498 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931), and see Harlan v. Archer, 79 Fed. (2d)
673 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935).
"As pointed out by Mr. Reno, supra n. 32, 94-5, In an earlier District
Court case, In re Moore, 22 Fed. (2d) 432 (D. C. Md. 1927) Judge Coleman
regarded Reilly v. Mackenzie as "entirely abolishing the common law rule
of inalienability of contingent remainders and executory interests and as
overruling the decision in In Re Banks' Will". Of course, this view must
be considered as overruled by Suskin and Berry v. Rumley, supra n. 57.
.0 Indeed, in the conclusion to Mr. Reno's article, supra n. 32, 118, he
raises the following question: "1. In view of the apparent conflict be-
tween In re Banks' Will and Reilly v. Mackenzie as to the alienability of
a contingent remainder or executory interest by -a prospective class mem-
ber, should Maryland adopt a statute making alienable 'any interest in
land whether immediate or future, vested or contingent'?"
There is little doubt that the proposed section 7 will effect the desired
result. Thus see the colloquy between Mr. Casner, the American Law In-
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basis of the rule denying transferability to future inter-
ests contingent as to the person to take which would indi-
cate that the public policy of this State is opposed to ex-
tending freedom of alienation to the instances suggested.
This is apparent from the fact that our equity courts have
consistently enforced assignments of these interests when
supported by a valuable consideration.61 Indeed, the dis-
tinction made in In re Banks' Will between a contingency
as to event and a contingency as to person has not been
followed in all jurisdictions and has been subjected to
searching criticism.62
The proposed Section 8, which purports to subject fu-
ture interests to the claims of creditors, does not present
any special problem of substantive law apart from what
has already been considered. It does, however, present
a number of serious procedural questions which go beyond
the distinction between remainders contingent as to per-
son and those contingent as to event. There is little diffi-
culty in cases involving the claim of a trustee in bank-
ruptcy to the bankrupt's interest in a future estate or in
cases where a creditor files a claimant's petition in a pend-
ing equity proceeding. In such instances Reilly v. Mac-
kenzie and Suskin and Berry v. Rumley point the way.
stitute Reporter who helped draft the Act, and Mr. Arthur W. Machen of
Baltimore, during the discussions which preceded the adoption of the Act
at the meeting of the American Law Institute. Vol. 15 Proceedings, op.
cit. supra n. 1, 158, 159: "Mr. Casner: . . . this section is designed to
. . . eliminate that common law doctrine that prevented some types of
property interest from being transferable simply because they were future.
That is all we are interested in eliminating. Mr. Machen: How about
a remainder which in my own State to a specific person is alienable
though contingent, but where the contingency is as to the person himself
it is not alienable-is this intended to change that rule? Mr. Casner:
That would depend upon the basis of the doctrine which prevents it from
being transferable when it is contingent as to persons. Sometimes the
person is non-existent. Of course, you cannot transfer it unless he Is an
existent person, but if an existent person owns the interest and it is con-
tingent upon his survival or something of that sort, it would be transfer-
able under this section."
It should be observed that the proposed section covers "future interests"
which is defined in section 1(b) to include land, things other than land,
executory interests and powers of termination (otherwise known as rights
of entry for condition broken) and possibilities of reverter, thus settling
the troublesome problem of alienability of rights of entry and possibilities
of reverter. See text at n. 37, supra.
61 Supra n. 39.
"' See the Massachusetts cases cited supra n. 48 and the criticism of this
distinction In 24 Amer. and Eng. Encyc. of Law, 406.
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But may a creditor subject his debtor's interest in a fu-
ture estate to attachment or execution? As Mr. Tiffany
points out,63 the answer to this question depends not only
upon whether the interest in question is capable of trans-
fer in accordance with the rules discussed above, but also
upon whether the statute authorizing attachment and exe-
cution sales is broad enough to apply to such a case.
The case of Armiger v. Reitz,64 seems to establish the
rule that although a vested remainder in real estate is lia-
ble to execution by a judgment creditor of the remainder-
man during the preceding life estate, personal property so
held cannot be reached by execution or attachment. And
Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Indep. Brewing Assoc.65 holds
that an equitable contingent remainder for life, although
limited to a definitely ascertained person, could not be at-
tached under the Code section. Specifically, the limita-
tion in that case was in trust to pay certain income to a
son of the testator and after his death to pay one-half of
the net income to his wife Catherine for life. During the
lifetime of her husband, creditors of Catherine laid an at-
tachment in the hands of the Trustee to charge her inter-
est in the trust estate. The Court said:
"Mrs. B took an equitable contingent remainder
under both wills and.., this interest in the hands
of the trustee was not subject to attachment .... -67
"While the language of the Code, Art. 9 sec. 10 is
very broad and provides that any kind of property or
credits belonging to the defendant . . . may be at-
tached, it has never been held, that it would apply
or cover a contingent or uncertain interest in a trust
estate, such as the one here in dispute."6 8
The Court then quoted from the case of Smith v. Gilbert,9
and adopted the reasoning there employed, which was to
the effect that the contingent interest in question could
68 2 Tiffany op. cit. 8upra n. 48, 2147, See. 550.
at 91 Md. 384, 341, 342, 46 A. 990, 991 (1900) ; and see Appellant's brief,
91 Md. 385.
" 127 Md. 463, 96 A. 617 (1916).
60 Md. Code (1924) Art. 9, See. 10.
O127 Md. 463, 466, 97 A. 17, 618 (1918).
8 127 Md. 463, 468, 97 A. 617, 619 (1916).
s"71 Conn. 149, 21 A. 284 (1898).
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not come within the purview of the attachment law be-
cause it was of too uncertain a value to be appraised and
fairly sold.
Of course, in Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Indep. Brew-
ing Assoc. the contingent interest was practically worth-
less as it was a mere equitable contingent remainder in
certain income for life. But there does not appear to be a
later Maryland case (specifically dealing with an attach-
ment issued to charge a contingent remainder) which gives
the least intimation as to whether a more substantial in-
terest (such, for example, as was involved in Reilly v.
Mackenzie) could be reached under our attachment laws. 0
The rule as to the enforceability of contingent remain-
ders in equity does not reach the problem as a valuable
consideration is required for its application, and creditors
have never been considered purchasers for value. As has
been previously pointed out, the proposed Section 8 does
not deal with procedure and its enactment would not af-
fect the principles of the Armiger or the Independent
Brewing Co. cases.
It is apparent that the proposed Section 8 would be
considerably restricted in its application (to say nothing
of the doubt it may throw upon an already confused sub-
ject) without an appropriate complementary modification
of the attachment laws. Any such amendment to the at-
tachment laws would necessarily have to be made with
a view to preventing injustice to the debtor-remainder-
man, which might result from a seizure and destruction of
a gift which can be of no present value to anyone, and may
never be of value to the debtor or his assignees. It is not
possible here to enter upon a discussion of this problem.7'
70 It is significant, however, in this connection that in Reilly v. Mackenzie,
151 Md. 216, 223, 134 A. 502, 505, 48 A. L. R. 778, 783, the Court said: ". . . so
far as the value of the interest is concerned, there can be no substantial
difference between a remainder which is technically vested but liable to be
defeated by the death of the remainderman before the death of the life
tenant, and a vested interest in a contingent remainder, the contingency
being the survival of the remainderman after the death of the life tenant.
A purchaser of either interest would take exactly the same chance of enjoy-
ing the possession of the property, and the risk would be no greater in the
one case than In the other."
7 See the discussion of this subject in 15 Proceedings, op cit. supra n. 1,106-169.
[VOL. IV
UNIFORM PROPERTY ACT
SECTION 9
Conveyance of Land or Thing Other Than Land Not
in the Possession of the Conveyor
Any act which would be effective as a conveyance
inter vivos or as a mortgage or as a testamentary dis-
position of property when the land or thing other than
land is in the possession of the conveyor, is effective
as a conveyance of the conveyor's interest therein,
when the land or thing other than land is out of the
conveyor's possession whether adversely held or not.
The purpose of this section is to avoid the effect of the
old English Pretended Title Act (32 Henry VIII, Ch. 9,
1540) by virtue of which a conveyance was void if the grant-
or was either out of possession at the time or, though in
possession at the time, had not been in possession himself
or by his ancestor, grantor, etc., for one year prior to the
conveyance.72 In 1868, our Court of Appeals, in Schafer-
man v. O'Brien73 held this statute to be obsolete. The Court
pointed out that they were not aware of any case in the
judicial history of the State where its provisions had been
enforced. It is apparent that possession by the grantor
of the property to be conveyed was never deemed essen-
tial for the effectiveness of a conveyance in this State.7" It
follows that the proposed Section 9 is merely declaratory
of the existing law in Maryland on this subject.
SECTION 10
Estates in Fee Tail (and Fee Simple Conditional)
Abolished
(The creation of fees simple conditional as they
existed under the law of England prior to the Statute
De Donis is not permitted). The creation of fees tail
is not permitted. The use in an otherwise effective
conveyance of property of language appropriate to
72 1 Alex. Br. Stat. (Coe's Ed. 1912) 421-424; 3 Tiffany, op cit. supra
n. 48, Sec. 590. For an historical survey of the subject see Costigan, The
Conveyance of Land by One Whose Lands Are in the Adverse Possession of
Another (1906) 19 Harv. L. Rev. 267.
,28 Md. 565, 92 Am. Dec. 708 (1868).7 t As further evidence of this already obvious fact, reference may be
made to the doctrine of notice of title resulting from possession of land.
See Frank, Title to Real and Leasehold Estates and Liens (1912) 137 et seq.
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create (such a fee simple conditional or) a fee tail,
creates a fee simple in the person who would have
taken (a fee simple conditional or) a fee tail. Any
future interest limited upon such an interest is a limi-
tation upon the fee simple and its validity is deter-
mined accordingly. Nothing herein contained shall
affect the operation of Sections 11, 12 and 13 of this
Act.
This proposed section is declaratory of the existing law
in Maryland. By virtue of the Acts of 1782, Ch. 23;75 the
Acts of 1786, Ch. 45; and the Acts of 1820, Ch. 191, as finally
amended by the Acts of 1916, Ch. 325,76 all fee simple condi-
tional estates77 and all fee tail estates, whether general or
special, have been abolished and have been rendered trans-
ferable, devisable and transmissible upon intestacy, as fee
simple estates. 78 For convenience, these statutes are quoted
in the foot-note.79
75 Md. Code (1924) Art. 21, Sec. 25.
76 Md. Code (1924) Art. 46, Sec. 1.
77 See Balto. & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Patterson, 68 Md. 606, 609, 13 A.
369, 370 (1888), holding that a fee simple conditional estate was converted
into a fee simple estate by virtue of Md. Laws 1786, Ch. 45, and Md. Laws
1820, Ch. 191, now (as amended by Md. Laws 1916, Ch. 325) Md. Code
(1924) Art. 46, Sec. 1.
78 Clarke v. Smith, Admr., 49 Md. 106 (1878) ; Pennington v. Pennington,
70 Md. 418, 436, 17 A. 329, 331, 3 L. R. A. 816, 820 (1889); Cowman v.
Classen, 156 Md. 428, 436, 144 A. 367, 371 (1927) ; Posey v. Budd, 21 Md.
477 (1864) ; 1 Alex. Br. Stat. (Coe's Ed. 1912) 126; Miller, op. cit. supra
n. 8, 343 et seq.; Venable, op. cit. supra n. 8, 16 et seq.
An examination of Posey v. Budd, supra, and the treatises cited will
disclose statements to the effect that an estate tail special may still be
created in Maryland and that although it may be barred by any form of
conveyance which would be legally operative to pass an estate in fee simple,
it cannot be devised. With the exception of Miller, Construction of
Wills, these authorities were written prior to the amendment to Md. Code
(1924) Art. 46, See. 1, enacted by Md. Laws 1916, Ch. 325. As will subse-
quently be shown in the text, Mr. Miller overlooked the effect of this
amendment, which was to put estates tail special in the same category
with estates tail general and make them equally devisable as fee simple
estates. See, in addition to the text, po8t, Hartogensis, Maryland Statu-
tory Modifications of the Common Law of Real Property (1937) 1 Md. L.
Rev. 238.
79 Md. Code (1924) Art. 21, See. 25 (Md. Laws 1782, Ch. 23) provides as
follows:
"Any person seized of an estate tail, in possession, reversion or re-
mainder, in any lands, tenements or hereditaments may grant, sell and
convey the same in the same manner and by the same form of conveyance
as if he were seized of an estate in fee simple; and such conveyance shall
be good and available, to all intents and purposes, against all persons
whom the grantor might debar by any mode of common recovery, or by
any ways or means whatsoever."
Md. Code (1924) Art. 46, Sec. 1 (Md. Laws 1916, Ch. 325, repealed Md.
Laws 1786, Ch. 45 and the amendatory Act, Md. Laws 1820, Ch. 191, so that
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There is a statement in Mr. Venable's book on Real
Property, followed by Mr. Miller in his treatise on Con-
struction of Wills,80 to the effect that "estates tail special
can still exist and be created in Maryland. The incidents
of such estates tail as can exist in Maryland are substan-
tially as at common law, except that they can be barred
by deed. Estates tail special cannot be devised." The
contrary view stated above renders desirable a brief state-
ment of the basis for the position taken herein.
The only substantial point of difference between the
authorities referred to and the view expressed above is
with respect to the devisability of an estate tail special.
As an aid to a full understanding of the matter, it should
be recalled that the present Section 1 of Article 46 of the
Code is the celebrated Chapter 325 of the Acts of 1916,
which for the first time assimilated the rules relating to
the devolution of real and personal property.81 Prior to
the Acts of 1916, Section 1 of Article 46 was commonly re-
ferred to as the Act to Direct Descents, having been origi-
nally enacted by the Acts of 1786, Ch. 45 and amended by
the Acts of 1820, Ch. 191. It was in consequence of this
Act to Direct Descents that the Court of Appeals in New-
ton v. Griffith,82 Posey v. Budd 5 and Pennington v. Pen-
nington,"4 held estates tail general (as distinguished from
estates tail special)" to have been abolished and rendered
descendible and devisable as fee simple estates. At the
these last mentioned acts do not appear in the headnote to this section in
the Annotated Code) :
"If any person seized of an estate in lands . . . in fee simple, fee 8imple
conditional, or in fee tail, general or special, (italics supplied) shall die
intestate thereof, said lands . . . shall descend in fee simple to those per-
sons who, according to the laws of this State now or hereafter in force
relating to the distribution of the personal property of intestates, would be
the distributees to take the surplus personal property of such intestate, if
he had died, possessed of such, and a resident of this State; and such heirs
shall take in the same proportions as are or shall be fixed by such laws
relating to personal property."
" See supra n. 78.
" See text, supra n. 9 and n. 10, and also supra n. 79.
" 1 H. and G. 111 (Md. 1827).
21 Md. 477, 486, 488 (1864).70 Md. 418, 436, 17 A. 329, 331, 3 L. R. A. 816, 820 (1889).
85 Illustrative of an estate tail general is a limitation to "A and the heirs
of his body". To "A and the heirs of his body by his wife B" or to "A and
the heirs male of his body" illustrate estates tail special.
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time of these decisions and prior to the Acts of 1916, re-
ferred to above, the statute read as follows:
"If any person seized of an estate in any lands...
in fee simple or fee simple conditional . . .or of an
estate in fee tail general ... shall die intestate there-
of" etc.
It is apparent that this statute referred specifically only
to estates in fee tail general, and as the Court said in Pen-
nington v. Pennington:""
"... the question is, would such an estate [fee tail
special] be within the meaning of the terms 'fee tail
general' as employed in the Act to direct descents, of
1820, Ch. 191, Sec. 1? According to settled construc-
tion, estates tail male, or estates tail female, are not
included within the definition of estates tail general,
as these latter terms are employed in the Act, and
by which Act estates tail general are converted into
fee simple estates. .. ."
And since the language of the statute which provided for
descent of an estate tail general in fee simple "if ... (he)
shall die intestate thereof" was interpreted as implying
the right to devise said estates;87 the Court, in construing
the Acts of 1798 Ch. 101 (Wills Statute), now Section 328
of Article 93,8 held that the express exclusion of "fee tail
estates" from the list of devisable estates there enumerated
applied only to estates tail special (which, as already
shown, had been excluded from the Act to Direct Descents)
and such estates tail general as had been created prior
to the Act to Direct Descents.8 9 It is undeniably clear from
8" 70 Md. 418, 435-436, 17 A. 329, 331, 3 L. R. A. 816, 820 (1889).
17 See Posey v. Budd, 21 Md. 477, 486, 488 (1864).11 Md. Code (1924) Art. 93, Sec. 328, reads in part as follows: "All
lands, . . . which might pass by deed, and which would, In case of the
proprietor dying intestate, descend to or devolve on his or her heirs or
their representatives, except estate8 tai ... shall be subject to be disposed
of, transferred and passed by his or her last will or codicil . .."
"See Posey v. Budd, 21 Md. 477, 488 (1864), where the Court said:
"The exception of 'estates tail', in the Act for amending and reducing into
one system the laws and regulations concerning last wills, (Md. Laws 1798,
Ch. 101, now in part codified as Md. Code (1924) Art. 93, See. 328) applies
to those estates created anterior to Md. Laws 1786, Ch. 45, (the Act to
Direct Descents) as well as to estates tail special, and strange to say, in-
cludes them among lands which, 'in case of the proprietor's dying intestate,
decend to or devolve on his or her heirs or representatives'. It must be
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these authorities that had estates tail special been included
in the Act to Direct Descents they would have been held
to have the same incident of devisability as was attributed
to estates tail general by virtue of that Act. When the
Act to Direct Descents was repealed and a new statute
enacted in its place by the Acts of 1916, Ch. 325, estates
tail special were expressly included.90 The conclusion is
therefore inescapable that estates tail special are now in
the same category as estates tail general and, accordingly,
may be devised as fee simple estates. This view finds sup-
port in an article by Mr. B. H. Hartogensis, wherein he
said: "It certainly would seem that if fees tail special
can descend in fee simple as they now do in cases of in-
testacy, they can be so devised."'"
As pointed out earlier herein,92 the authorities which
maintain that estates tail special may still be created in
Maryland and are not devisable were decided "or written
prior to the Acts of 1916, Ch. 325. This, of course, does not
apply to Miller's Construction of Wills, which was written
in 1927, and which has apparently overlooked the effect
of this last amendment to the Act to Direct Descents. But
without regard to any difference of opinion as to the ex-
isting Maryland law on this subject, the wisdom of enact-
ing the proposed Section 10 and thereby definitely clear-
confessed that in the Acts to direct descents, and the Act known as the
Testamentary System these words, 'estates tail' are used rather ambigu-
ously and without technical exactness".
In Laidler v. Young, 2 H. and J. 69, 71 (Md. 1806), relying on Paca's
Lessee v. Forwood, 2 H. and McH. 175 (Md. 1787), it was held that an
estate tail (without regard to whether it were general or special) could
not be devised by last will and testament by virtue of Md. Laws 1782, Ch.
23 (Md. Code (1924) Art. 21, Sec. 25, which provides for docking all fee
tail estates by conveyance inter vivo8, see n. 79, supra, and Pennington,
et al. v. Pennington, 70 Md. 418, 17 A. 329, 3 L. R. A. 810 (1878)). The
effect of Md. Laws 1786, Ch. 45 (Act to Direct Descents, now Md. Code
(1924) Art. 46, See. 1) was not considered, so that this case must be re-
garded as overruled by Posey v. Budd, 21 Md. 477 (1864), so far as it pur-
ports to deny the right to dispose of an estate tail general by will. And,
in accordance with the conclusion maintained in the text, both Laidler v.
Young and Posey v. Budd are overruled by Md. Laws 1916, Ch. 325 (Md.
Code (1924) Art. 46, Sec. 1) in so far as they deny devisability to estates
tail special.9 Supra n. 79.
91 Hartogensis, supra n. 78, 243.
Supra n. 78.
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ing up the matter cannot be doubted. As the Court of
Appeals said, speaking of fee tail estates in Key's Lessee
v. Davis: 3 "The policy of this State, growing out of our
peculiar institutions and form of government, has always
been to discourage this species of estates."
That part of the proposed Section 10 which reads,
"Any future interest limited upon such an interest (a fee
tail estate) is a limitation upon the fee simple and its
validity is determined accordingly," provides a test that is
now employed in Maryland. 4 When a remainder was
given expectant upon failure of issue, following a fee tail
estate, the Act to Direct Descents operated to change the
preceding fee tail estate into a fee simple estate, which,
in turn, necessarily operated to convert the future estate
from a remainder into an executory interest contingent
upon failure of issue. Prior to Article 93, Section 341 (as
to wills) and Article 21, Section 92 (as to deeds), the
words "failure of issue" were generally construed to mean
an indefinite failure of issue,"5 so that the executory in-
terest thus limited after the fee simple estate was void
because limited upon a contingency which might not oc-
cur within the period allowed by the Rule against Per-
petuities 0 But the statutes just referred to require that
the words "failure of issue" be construed (in the absence
of a contrary intention appearing in the instrument) to
mean a definite failure of issue, so that a remainder ex-
pectant upon a failure of issue, following a fee tail estate
which the Statute to Direct Descents operates to convert
into a fee simple estate, will be valid as an executory in-
terest contingent upon a definite failure of issue. This
was the result reached in Gambrill v. Forest Grove LodgeIT
9'1 Md. 32, 41 (1851).
' Gambrill v. Forest Grove Lodge, 66 Md. 17, 5 A. 548 (1886).
9 See discussion of the subject under the proposed Sec. 11, infra.
9e Newton v. Griffith, 1 H. & G. 111 (Md. 1827).
7 Supra n. 94.
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SECTION 11
Definite Failure of Issue
Whenever property is limited upon the death of
any person without "heirs" or "heirs of the body" or
"issue" general or special, or "descendants" or "off-
spring" or "children" of any such relative described
by other terms, such limitation, unless a different in-
tent is effectively manifested, is a limitation to take
effect only when such person dies not having such
relative living at the time of his death or in gestation
and born alive thereafter and is not a limitation to
take effect upon the indefinite failure of such relatives;
nor, unless a different intent is effectively manifested,
does it mean that death without such relative, in order
to be material, must occur in the lifetime of the crea-
tor of the interest.
The importance of determining whether, in a limita-
tion over to a third person should the first taker "die with-
out issue", the expression quoted means a definite or in-
definite failure of issue may be illustrated thus: "If prop-
erty is given to A, but if he 'die without issue', then over
to B, and if the words 'die without issue', mean if A's issue
ever dies out in the future and there is no living issue of
A left in the world, the gift over to B is too remote, and
therefore void; but if the words mean if A die without
issue living at the time of his death, then the gift over to
B is not too remote and is valid."' By statute in Mary-
land, it has long been the rule that the use of the words
"die without issue" shall be construed to mean a definite
failure of issue (that is, at the time of the death of the
first taker), rather than an indefinite failure of issue,
whether the expression is used in a deed99 or a will 100 "un-
less a contrary intention shall clearly appear."
98 Miller, op. cit. 8upra n. 8, Sec. 365.
9 Md. Code (1924), Art. 21, Sec. 92: "In any deed executed after the
7th day of April, 1886, of any real or personal estate, the words 'die with-
out issue', or 'die without leaving issue', or 'have no issue', or any other
words which may import either a want or a failure of issue of any person
in his lifetime, or at the time of his death, or an indefinite failure of his
issue, shall be construed to mean a want or failure of issue in the life-
time, or at the time of the death of such person, and not an indefinite
failure of his issue, unless a contrary intention shall appear by the deed".
10 Md. Code (1924), Art. 93, Sec. 341: "In any devise or bequest of real
or personal estate, the words 'die without issue', or 'die without leaving
1939]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
It is apparent, therefore, that the proposed Section 11
is merely declaratory of the existing law in this State. The
proposed section, it should be noted, is somewhat broader
than the Maryland statutes in that it expressly includes the
use of such words and phrases as "heirs", "heirs of the
body", "descendants", "offspring", and "children". The
Maryland statutes, however, have been extended to include
such expressions by reason of judicial construction of the
provision "any other words which may import either a
want or failure of issue", etc.1° 1
SEcTION 12
The Rule in Shelley's Case Abolished
Whenever any person, by conveyance, takes a life
interest and in the same conveyance an interest is
limited by way of remainder, either mediately or im-
mediately, to his heirs, or the heirs of his body, or his
issue, or next of kin, or some of such heirs, heirs of
the body, issue, or next of kin, the words "heirs",
"heirs of the body", "issue", or "next of kin", or other
words of like import used in the conveyance, in the
limitation therein by way of remainder, are not words
of limitation carrying to such person an estate of in-
heritance or absolute estate in the property, but are
words of purchase creating a remainder in the desig-
nated heirs, heirs of the body, issue, or next of kin.
This section is in accord with the Maryland law. As
pointed out by Mr. Hartogensis in the article hereinbefore
referred to: 102
"The fundamental doctrine of English land law
known as the rule in Shelley's case has been abolished
issue', or any other words which may import either a want or a failure of
issue of any person in his lifetime, or at the time of his death, or an in-
definite failure of his issue, shall be construed to mean a want or failure
of issue in the lifetime, or at the time of the death of such person, and not
an indefinite failure of his issue, unless a contrary intention shall appear
by the will."
In the recent case of Deets v. Riggins, 6 A. (2d) 239 (Md. 1939), a
definite failure of issue was held to have been intended without reference
to the statutory rule of construction.
101 See the cases cited in Miller, op. ct. 8upra n. 8, 1042-3.
I'l Supra, n. 78, 252.
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in Maryland by the Act of 1912.13 The destruction
of this doctrine is, however, inapplicable to instru-
ments executed prior to the date on which the act
took effect."' 4
SECTION 13
Effect of Conveyance to One and His Children-The
Doctrine Known as Rule in Wild's Case Abolished
When an otherwise effective conveyance of prop-
erty is made in favor of a person and his "children",
or in favor of a person and his "issue", or by other
words of similar import designating the person and
the descendants of the person, whether the convey-
ance is immediate or postponed, the conveyance cre-
ates a life interest in the person designated and a re-
mainder in his designated descendants, unless an in-
tent to create other interests is effectively manifested.
"By the 'rule in Wild's Case' (6 Co. Rep. 16) the pre-
sumption (in a gift to 'A and his children') that 'children'
is a word of purchase, gives way, if there are no children
at the time of the devise, to a contrary presumption, that
it is a word of limitation, the theory being that the chil-
dren cannot take in such case as remaindermen, because
this is not intended, and consequently the only way in
which any effect can be given to the word 'children' is by
giving to A an estate in fee tail."'105
In Stonebraker v. Zollickoffer 0 6 the Court said with
respect to the rule: "It has met with but little favor, and
has been reluctantly applied, and some courts have repudi-
ated it altogether, because it requires an artificial and
strained construction, inconsistent with the plain meaning
o' Md. Code (1924) Art. 93, Sec. 342 (italics supplied) : "Whenever by
any form of words in any deed, will or other instrument executed after
May 31, 1912, a remainder in real or personal property shall be limited,
mediately or immediately, to the heirs or the heirs of the body of a person
to whom a life estate in the same property is given, the persons who on the
termination of the life estate are then the heirs or heirs of the body of
such tenant for life, shall take as purchasers by virtue of the contingent
remainder so limited to them."
'0, For recent applications of the Rule in Shelley's case to wills executed
prior to the Act of 1912, see Rhodes v. Brinsfield, 151 Md. 477, 135 A. 245
(1926) ; and Cowman v. Classen, 156 Md. 428, 144 A. 367 (1929).
10' 1 Tiffany, op. cit. supra n. 48, 61. See also 2 Jarman, Wills (6th Ed.)
*1235.
10652 Md. 154, 159, 36 Am. Rep. 364 (1879).
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of words." Indeed, the abolition of fee tail estates (see
discussion under the proposed Section 10, supra) would in
itself tend to destroy the rule in Wild's Case."7 It is ap-
parent, therefore, that the proposed Section 13 does little
more than state the existing law in Maryland.
0 8
SECTIONS 14 AND 15
Section 14. Testamentary Conveyance to the Heirs
or Next of Kin of the Conveyor-Doctrine of
Worthier Title Abolished
When any property is limited, mediately or imme-
diately, in an otherwise effective testamentary convey-
ance, in form or in effect, to the heirs or next of kin
of the conveyor, or to a person or persons who on the
death of the conveyor are some or all of his heirs or
next of kin, such conveyees acquire the property by
purchase and not by descent.
Section 15. Inter Vivos Conveyance to the Heirs or
Next of Kin of the Conveyor
When any property is limited, in an otherwise
effective conveyance inter vivos, in form or in effect,
to the heirs or next of kin of the conveyor, which con-
veyance creates one or more prior interests in favor
of a person or persons in existence, such conveyance
operates in favor of such heirs or next of kin by pur-
chase and not by descent.
Since the assimilation of the rules governing the devolu-
tion of real and personal property,"9 the doctrine of
worthier title would seem to be of no practical importance
in Maryland. As pointed out by Mr. Miller in his work
on Construction of Wills :110
107 See 3 Jarman, Wills (7th Ed.) 1885, where, In referring to the English
Law of Property and Administration of Estates Acts of 1925, it Is said:
"Since, as we have seen, in the case of wills, coming into operation after
1925, estates tail can only be created by formal words, the rule in Wild's
Case is abolished."
10. See Stonebraker v. Zollickoffer, supra n. 106; Stump v. Jordon, 54
Md. 619 (1880); Downes v. Long, 79 Md. 382, 385, 386, 29 A. 827, 828-9
(1894) ; Williams v. Armiger, 129 Md. 222, 98 A. 542 (1916) ; Miller, op. cit.
supra n. 8, Secs. 85-90.
10I See text, supra n. 9.
110 Op. cit. supra n. 8, 219, Sec. 78.
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"The importance of this distinction between title
by descent and title by purchase generally lay in
the fact that under our statutes of descent prior to
the Act of 1916, Ch. 325, land acquired by an intestate
by descent passed to different persons than did land
acquired by purchase; the line of descent being con-
trolled by the source or manner of the tenure of the
intestate owner."
In discussing the rule that where a will devises land of
the same quantity and quality to a person who would take
it as heir at law, the title passes by the worthier title (that
is, by descent and not by purchase), Mr. Miller says: I"
"Although ... no reason for the rule now exists with us,
the rule still prevails in Maryland, not having been abol-
ished by statute, as was done in England in 1833." It
would seem, therefore, that the proposed sections are de-
sirable. 112
Ibid 221, Sec. 79.
112 It may be wise to make a further and more comprehensive study of
the proposed Section 15 than was possible in this article. Section 15 ap-
plies only in the case of conveyances inter vivo8. The author has been in-
formed by Professor Reno that in his proposed article on the Doctrine of
Worthier Title [published in this number of the RnviEw-Ed.] he will
dissent from the rule in Section 15. And in the letter from Mr. Charles
McHenry Howard, referred to in n. 31, supra, some doubt is cast upon the
advisability of enacting the proposed Section 15. As to this section Mr.
Howard said:
"The Law Institute, however, classifies as another instance or division
of the doctrine of worthier title, an old principle which, so far as I can
recall, we were not taught as coming under that name.
"There is an old rule to the effect that a remainder limited In a deed to
the 'heirs' of the grantor, is a reversion, and not a remainder. If there-
fore the grantor is dead when the property reverts, his heirs do not take
it under this principle as remaindermen under the deed. If the grantor
died intestate, the reversion would have descended to them, and they would
take the property as his heirs, by descent. If however he had willed his
reversionary right, the property would revert to his devisee, and not to his
heirs.
"As I have said, the Law Institute calls this another case of 'worthier
title', as you will see if you refer to Section 314 of Tentative Draft No. 11
of the Restatement of Property, which was one of the drafts passed upon
at the annual meeting of the Institute last month.
"Of course, this principle that a remainder to the heirs of the grantor
was considered to be a reversion reserved to the grantor, did not apply to a
will, where the testator would necessarily be dead when the instrument
became effective, and a limitation to his own heirs would not be a reversion
under this principle.
"My understanding of the reason for the two sections (14 and 15) in the
Uniform Act is therefore that Section 14 was intended to cover the principle
which I have heretofore understood to be that of the theory of 'taking by
the worthier title', while Section 15 is intended to cover this other class
of cases, as to which the old rule was more commonly expressed in the
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SECTION 16
Indestructibility of Contingent Interests
No future interest, whether legal or equitable, shall
be destroyed by the mere termination, in any manner,
of any or all preceding interests before the happening
of the contingency to which the future interest is sub-
ject.
One of the most important common law characteristics
of a contingent remainder was the possibility of its de-
struction by the termination of the preceding freehold es-
tate before the occurrence of the event upon which the
remainder was limited to take effect.113  This archaic and
unjust rule was abolished in Maryland in 1929,11' so that
the proposed section is in accord with the present Mary-
land law.
SECTION 17
Creation of Cross Remainders by Implication
When an otherwise effective conveyance of prop-
erty is made to two or more persons as tenants in com-
mon for life or for a term of years which is termin-
able at their deaths, with an express remainder,
whether effective or not,
form that a remainder to the heirs of the grantor should be considered as
creating a reversion, and not a remainder.
"I have some doubt as to whether Section 15 may not cause trouble. If
A conveys property to B for life, remainder on B's death to the heirs of A
(the grantor), and B, the life tenant, should die before A (the grantor),
then if under this section the limitation on B's death is to be treated as a
remainder to A's heirs, some questions may arise as to how such remain-
dermen are to be ascertained while A is still living (nemo est haeres
viventis). However, this is probably taken care of by Section 16 of the
Uniform Act (or our existing Section 305 of Art. 93, Code, Vol. 3), so that
the contingent remainder to 'heirs' of A would be preserved from destruc-
tion and take effect on A's death possibly with a reversion for the period
between B's death and A's death vested in A."
118 See Miller, op. cit. 8upra n. 8, 619, Sec. 223; and 1 Tiffany, op. cit.
supra n. 48, 502, Sec. 140.
"'1 Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 93, Sec. 305B: "Any contingent remainder
arising under any deed, will or other instrument executed after July 1,
1929, shall be capable of taking effect, notwithstanding the determination.
by forfeiture, surrender or merger, or otherwise, of any preceding estate of
freehold, in the same manner in all respects as if such determination had
not happened; and it shall not be necessary to appoint trustees to support
such contingent remainder in order to prevent the destruction thereof."
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(a) to the survivor of such persons, or
(b) upon the death of all the life tenants, to an-
other person or persons,
such conveyance, unless a different intent is effectively
manifested, creates cross-limitations among the sev-
eral tenants in common, so that the share of the one
first dying passes to his co-tenants to be held by them
in the same manner as their original shares, and the
shares of the second and others dying, in succession,
are similarly treated until the time when the property
is limited to pass as a whole to the remainderman.
"The term 'cross remainder' is ordinarily used to refer
to a situation where property is given to persons as ten-
ants in common, for life or in tail, and each tenant in com-
mon is given remainders in the shares of the others. These
reciprocal remainders are called cross remainders. Some-
times cross remainders are expressly given, but if they are
not, the question arises, when will they be implied as a
matter of construction? In general we may say that cross
remainders are implied in a will where there is a gift for
life or in tail to two or more persons as tenants in common
followed by a gift over of all the property at once. For
example, Blackacre is devised to A and B for life, and,
on the death of both of them, then to C in fee. Cross re-
mainders are implied here so as to give B a remainder for
life in A's undivided half and to give A a remainder for
life in B's undivided half."'115
The preceding gift to the tenants in common must be
for life in order for a cross remainder to be implied, as
it will not be implied where an absolute gift in fee (al-
though defeasible by death without issue or otherwise) is
given.116 The proposed section does not purport to change
115 2 Simes, op. cit. supra n. 12, See. 435; see also 1 Tiffany, op. cit. supra
n. 48, Sec. 142; and Miller, op. cit. supra n. 8, Sec. 224.
"' Fenby v. Johnson, 21 Md. 106 (1864) ; Marshall v. Safe Deposit com-
pany, 101 Md. 1, 11, 60 A. 476, 479 (1905), where a defeasible fee was given,
the Court said: "There is no word or expression in the will of Lavinia
Hopkins indicating an intention that accrued shares, under the residuary
clause, were designed by her to resurvive". Of course, there is nothing to
prevent the limitation of an expresa cross remainder in such cases, as was
done in Anderson v. Brown, 84 Md. 261, 35 A. 937 (1896), where the will
provided: "I do give and devise his or her share to the survivor or sur-
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this rule; as its operation is expressly confined to cases
where the conveyance to the tenants in common is "for
life or for a term of years"; and it seems that this is the
present rule in Maryland. 11
7
It is apparently settled that "cross remainders may be
created in a deed only by express limitation"." 8 This rule
is changed by the proposed Section 17, which permits an
implication of cross remainders in a deed as well as in a
will." 9 There is no sound reason why the rule should not
be so extended. Indeed, Professor Simes has demonstrated
the desirability of such an extension so far, at least, as
deeds of trust are concerned. 2 °
There is nothing revolutionary about this proposed sec-
tion as it "only applies where the language is such that the
property is to go over as a whole at one time.' 2 1 Whether
or not an estate by implication shall arise has always been
considered a question of the testator's intention upon a
construction of the will, 22 and this section will be help-
ful in working out a solution of this always vexatious
problem in cases that fall within its terms. The Court will
be aided by a presumption that a cross remainder was in-
tended, and its labors will be confined to a consideration
of whether "a different intent is effectively manifested"
by the instrument.
vivors, and this principle of survivorship I do direct to apply to any and
all accumulations by survivorship, not only to the original shares, but to
all accretions by survivorship until the death of any and all such children,"
etc. And see also Ijams v. Schapiro, 138 Md. 16, 113 A. 343 (1921).
1 17 Hoxton v. Archer, 3 G. and J. 199 (Md. 1831). In this case, however,
the estates were in fee tail, created prior to the Act to Direct Descents.
But the reason for implying a cross remainder is the same in an estate
granted for life, for as Professor Simes points out, 2 Simes, op. cit. supra
n. 12, 259-60: "Their purpose is to fill out a gap caused by an interstitial
intestacy; and if the first gift be not for life or in tail but in fee, then no
intestacy would occur and any such implied limitation would merely divest
a vested interest".
118 Miller, op. cit. supra n. 8, 622, 623; 1 Tiffany, op. cit. supra n. 48, 514;
2 Simes, op. cit. supra n. 12, 529.
119 The word "conveyance" in the proposed section must, of course, be
read in conjunction with its definition in Section 1 (c), which includes in-
struments having "inter vivos or testamentary operation".
110 2 Slmes, op. cit. supra n. 12, 259.
1"1 See Professor Casner's remarks, Vol. 15, American Law Institute Pro-
ceedings (1938) 192.
12 Miller, op. cit. supra n. 8, 623.
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SECTION 18
Identity of Grantor and Grantee
(1) Any person or persons owning property which
he or they have power to convey, may effectively con-
vey such property by a conveyance naming himself
or themselves and another person or persons, or one
or more of themselves and another person or other
persons, as grantees, and the conveyance has the same
effect as to whether it creates a joint tenancy, or ten-
ancy by the entireties, or tenancy in common, or ten-
ancy in partnership, as if it were a conveyance from
a stranger who owned the property to the persons
named as grantees in the conveyance.
(2) Any two or more persons owning property
which they have power to convey, may effectively con-
vey such property by a conveyance naming one, or
more than one, or all such persons as grantees, and
the conveyance has the same effect, as to whether it
creates a separate ownership, or a joint tenancy, or
tenancy by the entireties, or tenancy in common, or
tenancy in partnership, as if it were a conveyance
from a stranger who owned the property, to the per-
sons named as grantees in the conveyance.
(3) Any "person" mentioned in this Section may
be a married person, and any "person" so mentioned
may be persons married to each other.
The common law rule is well settled that a person may
not contract with himself nor make a conveyance in which
he is both grantor and grantee. 113  An interesting and un-
123 Brandau v. McCurley, 124 Md. 243, 248, 92 A. 540, 542, L. R. A. 1915C,
767 (1914) ; Tizer v. Tizer, 162 Md. 489, 160 A. 163, 161 A. 510 (1932) ;
Automobile Banking Corp. v. Automobile Brokerage Corp., Daily Record,
March 29, 1938 (Sup. Ct. Balt. City, 1938) ; 1 Williston, Contracts (Rev.
Ed. 1936) Sec. 18. See also the following cases which hold that no man
can sue himself or be both plaintiff and defendant in the same action:
Cousten v. Burke, 2 H. & G. 295, 18 Am. Dec. 297 (1828); Thompson v.
Young, 90 Md. 72, 44 A. 1037 (1899) ; Noel v. Noel, 173 Md. 152, 195 A. 315
(1937).
In Starr v. Starr M. P. Church, 112 Md. 171, 179-180, 76 A. 595, 598-599
(1910), applying the doctrine of merger to a case where the reversionary
interest in an estate became vested in the leaseholders, the Court said,
quoting Chancellor Kent: "There would be an absolute incompatibility in
a person filling, at the same time, the characters of tenant and reversioner
In one and the same estate; and hence the reasonableness, and even neces-
sity of the doctrine of merger."
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usual situation requiring the application of this rule was
presented in Tizer v. Tizer,'124 where the Tizer brothers
owned, together with their respective wives, as tenants by
the entireties, two adjoining lots in Baltimore County. A
building had been erected which covered all or a portion
of both lots. The two wives together with one Nagy de-
sired to use the building as a restaurant, and a lease was
entered into for this purpose. The lessors were the two
Tizer brothers and their wives; the lessees were the two
wives and Nagy. Later a distraint was issued for rent in
arrears, and the validity of the lease was questioned in a
replevin suit. The lease was held invalid because, "In this
case we have the conveyance made by all of the parties hold-
ing as tenants by the entireties, which would constitute a
good lease if the lessees were not persons who were also
necessarily lessors". It is significant that the Court at-
tached no importance to the fact that Nagy, a third party,
was named as lessee along with the two wives, as this dem-
onstrates that Maryland was not (prior to the Acts of 1931,
Ch. 484) among those jurisdictions which sought to modify
the harshness of the common law rule insofar as it ap-
plied to cases in which an individual appearing on one
side of a contract also appears on the other side in asso-
ciation with others. In jurisdictions where the rule was
thus modified, recognition is given to contracts and con-
veyances between parties in which one or more persons
appear on both sides, provided that on one side at least,
they are joined with some other and different persons as
members of a unified group.125 As pointed out by Profes-
sor Williston: 26 "For those States which feel the com-
mon law precedent is too strong to be overthrown by judi-
cial fiat, the Commissioners on Uniform Laws in 1925 rec-
ommended The Uniform Interparty Agreement Act". This
statute127 was adopted in Maryland in 1931, and provides: 128
S upra n. 123.
12 1 Williston, op. cit. supra n. 123, 28-29.
121 Ibid.
:
17 Md. Laws 1931, Ch. 484, now Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 50, Secs.
13A-13F.
128 Ibid, Sec. 13A.
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"A conveyance, release or sale may be made to or
by two or more persons acting jointly and one or more,
but less than all, of these persons either by himself or
themselves or with other persons; and a contract may
be made between such parties."
The statute is not retroactive,'19 and it was therefore not
before the Court in the Tizer case, which involved a lease
executed before its effective date. It is apparent, however,
that the lease in that case would now be valid under the
Uniform Interparty Agreement Act. And this would seem
equally true though no third party joined with the two wives
as lessees, as they would still constitute "less than all" the
lessors. It should be observed that there is nothing in either
the existing Maryland statute or the proposed Section 18
which affects any of the incidents of a tenancy by the entire-
ties, except that they render unnecessary a resort to the fic-
tion of a straw man where the spouses jointly determine that
one of them shall enjoy the property in severalty. By
analogy a straw man may be dispensed with in cases where
a man owns property in severalty and he desires to vest
the title in himself and wife as tenants by the entireties or
in himself and another as tenants in common or joint ten-
ants.130
It must be borne in mind that the present Maryland
statute validates such agreements and conveyances only
where identical persons do not appear on both sides of
the instrument. Thus conveyances from A on one side to
A and B on the other side, or from A, B, and C on one side
to A on the other side-or A and C, would be valid under
Section 13A of Article 50. But a conveyance from A, B,
and C on one side to A, B, and C on the other side is in-
valid and not authorized by the section referred to. Thus
Professor Williston says: '3'
"'. Ibid, See. 13D.
,10 A similar view was suggested by Mr. Hartogensis, 8upra n. 78, 253.
See also In re Vandergrift's Estate, 105 Pa. Super. 293, 161 A. 898, where
Section 1 of the Uniform Interparty Agreement Act was construed as
permitting a grantor to create a joint tenancy or tenancy by the entireties
by a direct conveyance to himself and another without the use of a straw
man.13, 1 Williston, op. cit. supra n. 123, 28-29.
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"Neither the Restatement nor the Uniform Inter-
party Agreement Act has attempted to vary the com-
mon law view that a man cannot contract with him-
self, where he appears as an individual party on each
side . . .or where the very same persons appear on
both sides."
Unfortunately, it is submitted, sub-section (2) of the pro-
posed Section 18 undertakes to abolish the "common law
view" which is established in Maryland and preserved, as
modified, by the Interparty Agreement Act. Under sub-
section (2) a conveyance is authorized from any two or
more persons to "one, or more than one, or all such per-
sons, as grantees," so that a conveyance from A and B to
A and B would be valid. It is true that in order for this
sub-section to be operative the property must be owned
originally by at least two persons, but such a case is no dif-
ferent in principle from one in which the property is owned
by one person.13 2 The absurdities that might result from
a conveyance from A to A will likewise result from a con-
veyance from A and B to A and B. Illustrative of the
anomaly which may follow such a transaction is the nisi
prius case of Automobile Banking Corporation v. Automo-
bile Brokerage Corporation, ' 3 where one Myers, trading as
the Annapolis Nash Company, sold an automobile to him-
self under a conditional sales contract and thereafter dis-
counted the contract with a finance company. In holding
the contract void as against another finance company who
had sold the car in question to Myers under a conditional
sales contract which it had failed to record in time, Judge
O'Dunne said (referring to the authorities cited by
counsel) :
"They are to the effect that a contract in which
'A' is vendor, and 'A' vendee, is in law a nullity. In
the brief of defendant's counsel the force of this posi-
tion becomes apparent with the character of clauses
contained in said purported contract, namely: 'Title to
1. Sub-section (1) of the proposed Section 18, which deals with convey-
ances of property owned by one person, requires (as does Md. Code Supp.
(1935) Art. 50, See. 13A) that "another person" be named as grantee.
138s upra n. 123.
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said motor vehicle shall remain in the seller until all
amounts due thereunder are fully paid in cash', Myers
being seller (under the name Annapolis Nash Com-
pany) and Myers being purchaser (under the name
of James 0. Myers). The same contract also provides
that sale or assignment of the contract shall not oper-
ate to pass title to the car from seller to purchaser,
which seller may do without notice to purchaser, etc.
'Thus (quoting from brief of counsel) Myers, as
seller, may sell or assign the contract but Myers, as
purchaser, may not. Myers, as purchaser, cannot as-
sign, encumber, or dispose of the motor vehicle or re-
move it from the city where located, but Myers, as
seller, may do all of these things. In said contract,
Myers, as purchaser, agrees not to do the things which
as seller he is expressly permitted to do. If, as pur-
chaser, he fails to pay the installments, then, as seller,
he can retake the car from himself because of his owndefault! ' "
Similar illustrations suggest themselves, as for example
a lease from A and B to A and B, containing the usual
covenant to pay the rent, etc. The anomalous situation
thus created is aptly characterized in an English case,
where the Court said: "The covenant to my mind is sense-
less; I do not know what is meant in point of law by a man
paying himself.'13 4
This departure from the policy of this State, as ex-
pressed in the Uniform Interparty Agreement Act, may be
easily remedied by eliminating the words "or all such per-
sons, as grantees," from the proposed sub-section (2) and
inserting in lieu thereof-"but less than all such persons,
as grantees." The proposed section would then be in en-
tire conformity with the existing law in Maryland, and
would clear up the ambiguity that now exists under the
Uniform Interparty Agreement Act as to the type of con-
current estate which results from such conveyances as are
there authorized.
'Faulkner v. Lowe, 2 Ex. 593, 154 Eng. Repr. 628 (1848). See also
Napier v. Williams, (1911) 1 Ch. 361 which, in the absence of a statute
similar to our Interparty Agreement Act, held void a lease from A, B, and
C, as lessors to A, as lessee.
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SECTION 19
Conveyance by Married Woman
A married woman has the power to convey effec-
tively her property without the consent or joinder of
her husband, in the same manner and to the same ex-
tent as if she were unmarried.
She is thus empowered to convey or release her
inchoate dower, and her interest in property owned
by her and her husband as tenants by the entirety;
provided that her husband's marital rights, dower and
statutory rights, if so expressly agreed to by him may
thereby be affected; provided further, that no acqui-
sition of property passing to the wife from the hus-
band after coverture, or vice versa, shall be valid if
the same has been made or granted to her (him) in
prejudice of the rights of his (her) subsisting credi-
tors, who, however, must assert their claims within
three years after the acquisition of the property by
the wife (husband), or be absolutely barred, and for
the purpose of asserting their rights under this sec-
tion, claims of creditors of the husband (wife) not
yet due and matured shall be considered as due and
matured.
The second paragraph of this section is a variation from
the form in which the section was originally drafted and
approved by the American Law Institute and the Commis-
sioners on Uniform Laws. This modification or addition,
however, was made pursuant to the following note to the
original draft:
"Note: Each State should specify whether or
not this Section is to give a married woman the power
to convey her dower interest, her interest in commu-
nity property, her interest in property owned by her
and her husband as tenants by the entireties. It should
also be stated whether or not a conveyance by a mar-
ried woman is to affect any of the marital rights of
the husband, such as dower, curtesy ..... Finally,
each State should consider the necessity of a provi-
sion protecting creditors from fraudulent conveyances
by a married woman."
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There are a number of objections to the enactment of
this proposed section in Maryland, either in its original
form (first paragraph only) or as it now stands modified.
It is apparent from the note quoted above that the pro-
posed section was intended merely as a frame work for
a married woman's "equal rights statute" with respect to
property. For many years in Maryland, the wife has en-
joyed complete emancipation from her common law disa-
bilities, and her right to hold and enjoy her property has
been equalized with the right of a husband to hold and
enjoy his.' Under Section 4 of Article 45, married women
are given the right to hold their property as if unmarried
and the same right to convey or dispose of it "that hus-
bands have to dispose of their property and no more." The
first paragraph of the proposed section goes further than
this and gives a right of disposition "to the same extent
as if she were unmarried." It thus confers a more exten-
sive power of disposition upon the wife than the husband
now has and would permit her to cut off her husband's
dower interest by a conveyance without his joinder. This,
of course, would be inconsistent with Section 3, of Article
46, which prohibits the husband or wife from "conveying
by deed inter vivos, his or her real estate free of any right of
dower of any husband or wife therein without the joinder
of said husband or wife."'M8  But since Section 21A of the
proposed Act repeals all inconsistent laws, a serious ques-
tion might be raised as to whether the proposed section
has the effect of eliminating the wife from the restriction
in the existing law last quoted. It is true that the sec-
ond paragraph of the proposed section attempts to prevent
this by a clause which reads "provided that her husband's
marital rights, dower and statutory rights, if so expressly
agreed to by him may thereby be affected." But it is not
desirable to substitute such vague and uncertain language
for the clear and definite provisions contained in the ex-
isting law. 3  Besides, the clause last quoted might be
'll Hartogensis, supra n. 78, 248-249.
... See also Md. Code (1924) Art. 45, See. 12, which provides the form by
which the husband or wife may relinquish dower.
"" Md. Code (1924) Art. 46, Sec. 3, quoted in the text.
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construed to require the husband's joinder in order to cut
off his "statutory rights" or thirds in chattels real or chat-
tels personal, 3 ' and to this extent the wife's present power
of disposition would be greatly curtailed.
So much of the second paragraph of the proposed sec-
tion as purports to empower the wife "to convey or release
her inchoate dower" is already clearly and satisfactorily
covered by Section 12 of Article 45, which provides that
"any married woman may, at whatever age she may be,
relinquish her dower in any real estate by the joint deed
of herself and husband or by her separate deed .... And
in like manner any husband may relinquish his interest in
the real estate of his wife by joint or several deed." Like-
wise, the provision in the second paragraph of the pro-
posed section, which seeks to protect creditors against con-
veyances between husband and wife by raising a presump-
tion of fraud, is now adequately covered by Section 1 of
Article 45, as amended.'39 Conceding for the moment the
desirability of transplanting the existing Section 1 of Arti-
cle 45, by incorporating it in the proposed Act, it should
more properly be codified under the proposed Section 20
(hereinafter discussed) which deals with a related sub-
ject-"Conveyances Between Husband and Wife."
The proposal in the second paragraph of the section
under discussion that a wife be permitted to dispose of "her
interest in property owned by her and her husband as ten-
ants by the entireties" is a radical departure from the pres-
ent Maryland law, which requires the joint act of both
spouses to effect a transfer of any interest in entirety prop-
erty.140 Without regard to the question of policy involved
in a proposal to abolish the common law incidents of a
tenancy by the entireties, the clause quoted is clearly ob-
jectionable as it now stands because it does not confer an
equal privilege upon the husband; nor does it state whether
the interest transferred pursuant to the power so conferred
shall be an absolute interest in the grantee or an interest
188 It must be remembered that the proposed Act applies to all species of
property, see Sections 1 and 3.1 Md. Laws 1929, Ch. 398, now Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 45, Sec. 1.
Tizer v. Tizer, 162 Md. 489, 160 A. 163, 161 A. 510 (1932).
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defeasible upon the death of the wife prior to her hus-
band. In addition, there is a sharp difference of opinion
as to the desirability of destroying the common law inci-
dents of estates by the entireties. Some authorities feel
that such estates are based on a conception of the mar-
riage relation which no longer obtains and that they are
not in harmony with the usages of the community.'41
Others regard the estate as a beneficent one, without fraud
upon creditors and beneficial to the community. 42 There
can be little doubt that the settled policy of this State has
been to preserve intact all the common law incidents of
estates by the entireties. It is, perhaps, difficult to explain
the paradox of a policy which approves the fiction of unity
between husband and wife for the purpose of preserving
what many feel is a legal anachronism, but which con-
demns it for all other purposes. 14 3 But it is questionable
whether anything should be done to impair the established
rule on the subject in this jurisdiction without a more care-
ful and comprehensive study of the various aspects of the
problem, including an investigation of the experience and
practice in other States.
In view of what has been said, it would be well to elimi-
nate the entire proposed Section 19. The subject which it
embraces is now fully covered by several clearly stated
and well understood sections of our Code; and it would
seem unwise to substitute for them a new and somewhat
obscurely phrased section, which must await interpreta-
tion by our Court of Appeals. Besides, the section was in-
tended as a mere framework or guide for States not hav-
ing fully emancipated their married women; and the usual
objection to a departure from the provisions of a uniform
law by deletion or modification does not apply, as the note
141 See cases cited in 1 Tiffany, op. cit. supra n. 48, 651.
See (1935) 14 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 12-13.
148Reference, of course, is made to the several Married Women's
Emancipatory Acts in Maryland. One of the most recent statutes indica-
tive of this policy, although not technically involving the doctrine of unity,
is the Md. Laws 1931, Ch. 398, Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 35, Sec. 4B
which abolishes the presumption of coercion by the husband in the case
of a criminal offense committed by the wife in the husband's presence.
See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Parke in Tizer v. Tizer, supra
n. 140.
1939]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
to the original draft (quoted above) clearly shows that it
was not intended that this section should be uniformly
adopted.
SECTION 20
Conveyances Between Husband and Wife
A married person has the power to convey effec-
tively property directly to his or her spouse in the
same manner and to the same extent as if he or she
were unmarried.
This section is merely declaratory of the existing law
in Maryland. As in the proposed Section 19, discussed
above, there is a similar note to the original draft which
cautions each State to "consider the necessity of a provi-
sion protecting creditors from being defrauded by convey-
ances between spouses." Assuming that the suggestion
for eliminating this subject matter from the proposed Sec-
tion 19 is adopted, it would be wise to add the following
amendment to the section now under discussion: "sub-
ject to the provisions of Section 1, Article 45, Code, 1935
Supplement. ''144
SECTION 21
Waste-Damages Recoverable
When conduct claimed to constitute waste is made
the basis of a claim for damages, the claimant is lim-
ited to a recovery of compensatory damages and is
not entitled to multiple damages or to declare a for-
feiture of the place wasted or of the interest of the de-
fendant in the place wasted except in accordance with
covenants, agreements or conditions binding such de-
fendants.
144 This section, Md. Code (1924) Art. 45, Sec. 1 (which renders pre-
sumptively invalid as to creditors a conveyance between spouses) was
originally confined to conveyances from the husband to the wife. By Md.
Laws 1929, Ch. 398, Md. Code Supp. (1935) Art. 45, Sec. 1, it was extended
to include conveyances from the wife to the husband. It should be ob-
served that such conveyances, like conveyances between strangers, are also
subject to the provisions of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act, Md.
Code (1924) Art. 39B, and the Statute of 13 Eliz., Ch. 5. See Bradford v.
Harford Bank, 145 Md. 653, 657, 125 A. 719, 721-2 (1924) ; and Kennard v.
Elkton Banking and Trust Co., 6 A. (2d) 258 (Md. 1939).
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Alexander's work on British Statutes145 indicates that
the Statutes of Marlbridge (51 Henry 3, Ch. 23) and
Gloucester (6 Edward 1, Ch. 5) are still in force in Mary-
land. By the latter statute, the plaintiff in an action of
waste was entitled to recover treble damages, and the de-
fendant forfeited the thing he had wasted. But the old
action of waste, as known to the common law and as modi-
fied by the Statutes of Marlbridge and Gloucester, seems
to be obsolete in Maryland, the action on the case being
invariably resorted to for the recovery of damages due
to waste.14 Thus, in Dickinson v. Baltimore,147 the Court
said:
"To avoid the defective and inadequate remedy af-
forded by this action (waste) . . . the action on the
case in the nature of waste, as it is denominated, was
devised, . .. It entitles the party to recover for the
actual damage committed, with costs, against anyone
who commits the wrong, whether lessee or stranger."
(Italics supplied.)
The language just quoted (especially the matter in ital-
ics) would seem to be a clear indication that the plaintiff
in an action on the case for waste in Maryland is confined to
a recovery of his "actual damage" and that the Statute of
Gloucester, allowing treble damage and providing for a for-
feiture, is not applicable. The early case of White v. Wag-
ner 48 was an action on the case for waste, and the opinion
intimates that the Statutes of Marlbridge and Gloucester
will be looked to only for the purpose of determining what
persons are liable for waste and not for the purpose of de-
termining the measure of damages. 9
It is reasonable to conclude that the Maryland law
does not allow multiple damages or forfeiture in suits to
1 Alex. Br. Stat. (Coe's Ed. 1912) 61 et 8eq., 112 et 8eq.
1,6 See 1 Poe, Pleading and Practice (5th Ed. 1925) Sec. 164; and cases
cited in ibid. 124, n. 31.
11T 48 Md. 583, 589, 30 Am. Rep. 492, 494 (1878).
148 4 H. & J. 373, 392, 393, 7 Am. Dec. 674, 678-679 (Md. 1818).
"I Thus, the Court said (4 H. & J. 393) ". . . it (the action on the case)
confines the recovery to the real loss sustained; and I see no reason to say
that it will not lie in all cases, and against all persons, who are at common
law, or under the Statutes of Marlbrldge and Gloucester, made liable to
the action of waste".
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recover for waste, and that, therefore, the proposed sec-
tion is merely declaratory of the existing law. Attention,
however, is directed to Section 82 of Article 16 of the Code,
which provides that if a defendant violates an injunction
to stay waste by thereafter committing waste, the Court
"shall ascertain the damage done by the waste . . . and
may fine the defendant to the extent of double the dam-
age done and so ascertained." This provision does not con-
flict with the conclusion reached herein as it simply pro-
vides for the payment of a "fine", presumably to the Court,
as punishment for a contempt. The plaintiff is given no
right to receive any part of the amount so assessed.
The proposed section is clearly desirable as it will defi-
nitely set at rest any doubt which might otherwise exist
as to the measure of damages in actions for waste and the
applicability of the Statutes of Marlbridge and Gloucester.
It would seem, however, that the proposed section should
be so amended as to make it clear that the right to exem-
plary damages is not denied in cases where the wrong-
doer is guilty of a wilful and deliberate trespass or where
there are other facts and circumstances of aggravation. 5 '
SECTION 21A
This Act is to be in substitution of Inheritances,
Art. 46, Secs. 1-7, Bagby's Code, hereby revoked to-
gether with any Acts of said Code inconsistent there-
with.
The provision in this proposed section, repealing Sec-
tions 1 to 7 of Article 46, was obviously inserted through
an error, as these sections contain the law assimilating the
rules of devolution of real and personal property and other
necessary provisions which are entirely consistent with
the proposed Act. The proposed Section 21A, therefore,
should be amended by deleting the reference to Sections
1 to 7 of Article 46.
150 See Barton Coal Co. v. Cox, 39 Md. 1, 17 Am. Dec. 525 (1873) ; Grob
v. South, 121 Md. 639, 641, 89 A. 321, 322 (1913) ; Realty Co. v. Sachse, 154
Md. 34, 139 A. 529 (1927) ; 1 Poe, op. cit. supra n. 146, Sec. 250.
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SECTIONS 22 To 24
These sections contain the usual provisions as to uni-
form interpretation, effective date and short title.151
CONCLUSION
On the whole, the Uniform Property Act is desirable
legislation and, with the few modifications suggested here-
in, should be adopted. It is true that in many particulars
the Act is merely declaratory of the existing law in this
State, and, indeed, Maryland may be justly proud that it
has been so progressive in modernizing its law of property.
Yet the proposed Act will do much to carry us forward in
the never ending process of molding the law to the times
by clarifying several obscure features of this complex
branch of the law which still remain the subject of contro-
versy and doubt in Maryland.
151 Section 22. Interpretation. This Act shall be so interpreted and con-
strued as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those
States which enact it.
Section 23. This Act Not Retroactive. This Act shall take effect on the
first day of June, 193- but shall not apply to acts which occurred, or to
conveyances which became effective, before that date.
Section 24. Short Title.
This Act may be referred to as the "Uniform Property Act".
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